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Executive summary 
Why do some corporations decide to voluntarily disclose information regarding a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in contrast to others? In order to 
explain why some corporations disclose more information on this topic than others, first, 
the literature on liability of directors, remedies against these liabilities and motives for 
voluntary disclosure is researched. After that, empirical research is performed to 
determine if listed corporations in The Netherlands significantly differ in disclosing 
information regarding a granted indemnification clause and a concluded directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance. 
 
1. Presentation of the research problem 
Public indignation regarding a number of corporate scandals have lead to an increasing 
demand of transparency and information disclosure and an emphasis on the importance of 
decision usefulness of annual reports. According to Foster (1986), the usefulness of 
financial statements is affected by the content or timing of information disclosures. The 
most important way for corporations to disclose information is still through regulated 
financial reports, including the financial statements (Healy and Palepu 2001). Besides 
information disclosure that is prescribed by regulations, corporations can also disclose 
information voluntary. Voluntary disclosure is the release of financial and non-financial 
information in excess of that what is required by regulations. 
 
Improving the decision usefulness of annual reports is a topical subject. The most 
important criticism is the fact that the information being provided in annual reports is too 
much based on the past and insufficiently focused on the future (Knoops 2004). More 
information should be disclosed dealing with opportunities and threats, risks and all sorts 
of events and circumstances that can be of influence on future developments of the 
corporation. Disclosing more information about possible risks and whether or not the 
corporation has taken any precautions to cover those elements of risk could contribute to 
this. In other words, disclosing information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of 
internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance could enhance the decision usefulness of annual reports. 
Especially interesting to see, is whether corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX 
significantly differ in disclosing information concerning this subject.  
 
                                             
17 Supervisor: Drs. R. van der Wal RA. The author is currently employed at KPMG Accountants N.V. 
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The research question is formulated as follows: 
 
Why do some corporations, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, decide to voluntarily disclose 
information in their annual report or articles of association concerning a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in contrast to others? 
 
In the second chapter prior literature is discussed. The chapter will start with an overview 
of the legal grounds on which a director can be held liable according to Dutch law. The 
legal grounds for liability of directors will be discussed because an exclusion or limitation 
of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance only become relevant after a directors is being held liable for his actions 
or his failure to act. It is important to know what the scope of coverage is of these 
different remedies and to what extend a listed corporation in The Netherlands is obligated 
by Dutch law to disclose information concerning a granted exclusion of liability and 
indemnification clause and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. This will 
be discussed in the second part of this chapter. If corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or 
AScX significantly differ from each other in disclosing information regarding a granted 
exclusion of liability and indemnification clause and a concluded directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance, a possible explanation might be found in accounting theory. To this 
end, in the last part of this chapter, some light will be shed on Positive Accounting Theory, 
research on voluntary disclosure and the Signalling Theory. 
The third chapter presents the research design. 
In the fourth chapter the empirical results will be elucidated. 
Possible explanations for differences in the level of disclosure will be discussed in the fifth 
chapter using the theoretical framework of the second chapter. At the end of this chapter 
suggestions for future research will be given. 
Some conclusions will be drawn and a short summary will be given in the sixth chapter. 
 
 
2. Prior literature 
 
2.1. Legal grounds for liability of directors 
First an overview will be given of the legal grounds on which a director can be held liable 
according to Dutch law. Only Civil Code provisions are discussed since these provisions 
most often lead to settlements or result in directors having to pay damages. Dutch 
scholarly writers generally make a distinction between internal and external liability of 
directors. 
 
2.1.1. Internal liability 
Internal liability can be seen as liability towards the corporation. The mean rule of internal 
liability can be found in Section 2:9. This provision provides that each managing director 
has an obligation towards the legal entity to perform properly the duties assigned to him. 
Managing directors must have a certain amount of freedom to lead the corporation. 
Entrepreneurship means taking risks every now and then. Not every mistake or incorrect 
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choice of policy automatically leads to liability (Assink and Olden 2005). When a managing 
director causes damages to the corporation, these damages can, under certain 
circumstances, be recovered by the corporation from the director. The Supreme Court has 
held that a managing is liable for the damages the corporation has suffered if, depending 
on all the circumstances, serious negligence (ernstig verwijt) is attributable to him.18 
According to Van Schilfgaarde (2006) and Orsel (2005) serious negligence not only covers 
behavior of which a managing director ‘knew’ it would lead to damages but also behavior 
of which he ‘should have known’ would cause damages to the corporation. The underlying 
idea of Section 2:9 is collective responsibility resulting in joint and several liability. 
However, the director has the possibility of individual exoneration. 
 
Unique for The Netherlands is the right to initiate inquiry proceedings 
(enquêteprocedure)19 before the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) of the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals. The Enterprise Chamber will grant a request for an inquiry if 
there is a good reason to doubt the proper management of the corporation.20 Experts will 
then be appointed by the court. These experts will produce a report on their findings of 
the inquiry. Central to this inquiry are the policy and the course of affairs (beleid en gang 
van zaken) in the corporation. If, on the basis of this report, the Enterprise Chamber finds 
mismanagement (wanbeleid), it may set aside corporate resolutions. The Enterprise 
Chamber can allow the corporation to recover the costs of the inquiry from the managing 
and supervisory directors. The Supreme Court held that a decision of the Enterprise 
Chamber finding mismanagement does not imply that a director is personally liable. The 
Supreme Court added that the stated facts in inquiry proceedings are still uncertain in civil 
proceedings. Nevertheless, the inquiry proceedings can have great significance in the area 
of liability of directors. 
 
2.1.2. External liability 
External liability is liability towards third parties. The basic tort (onrechtmatige daad) 
provisions are set forth in Sections 6:162 and 6:163. To protect creditors and to prevent 
abuse of legal entities, three acts were introduced in the 1980’s. The First Abuse Act is not 
relevant for directors’ liability. The Second Abuse Act provides for personal liability of 
managing directors for premium, wage tax and value added tax obligations of a legal entity 
that is in default in its payments thereof, if the non payment is caused by the managing 
director’s evidently improper management (kennelijk onbehoorlijk bestuur). The structure 
of the Second Abuse Act is similar to that of the Third Abuse Act. Therefore it will not be 
discussed in more detail since the Third Abuse Act is of greater importance in view of 
liability of directors. The Third Abuse Act makes it possible for the trustee in bankruptcy to 
hold directors liable for evident improper management that has led to the bankruptcy. 
Section 2:138/248 provides that each director is jointly and severally liable to the 
bankruptcy estate in the amount of any liabilities that cannot be satisfied out of the 
                                             
18 HR January 10, 1997, NJ 1997, 360, JOR 1997, 29 (Staleman/Van de Ven) and HR April 4, 2003, JOR 2003, 134 (Skipper 
Club Charter). 
19 Section 2:129/239. 
20 Section 2:350(1). 
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liquidation proceeds, if it is evident that the board has performed its duties improperly 
and plausible that this was an important cause of the bankruptcy.21 The Supreme Court 
ruled that there is evidently improper management if no reasonable managing director 
would perform his duties is such manner under the same conditions.22 The director can 
avoid liability if he proves the shortcoming is not attributable to him and he has not 
breached any duty to take measures to prevent its consequences.23 Liability cannot be 
avoided by making an appeal to internal assignment of duties. No director can avoid his 
responsibilities by saying that he lacks the specific expert knowledge that is required to 
understand the decision being made in those situations. The Third Abuse Act attaches 
great importance to the duty to engage in proper bookkeeping and the duty to make the 
annual accounts public. In the event of a bankruptcy there is an irrefutable presumption 
that the board has preformed these two duties improperly. In addition, there is a refutable 
presumption that this improper performance was an important cause of the bankruptcy. 
 
If the annual accounts, interim accounts and annual report give a misleading presentation 
of the situation of corporation, the managing directors are jointly and severally liable to 
third parties for any resulting damage.24 This liability is only relevant to the extent that 
these documents have been made public. The misleading presentation must relate to the 
current financial condition of the corporation. A director can only avoid liability by 
showing that the misleading presentation is not attributable to him. Section 2:150/260 
contains a similar rule for the supervisory directors, with two exceptions. Firstly, this 
Section does not apply to the interim accounts and the annual report. Secondly, the 
individual avoidance of liability is treated differently with respect to the annual accounts. 
To avoid liability a supervisory director only has to show that the misleading presentation 
is not due to any failure in the exercise of his supervisory duties (De Savornin Lohman 
1996). The supervisory director may rely on the information provided to him by the 
management board and the auditors (Asser-Maeijer 2000). 
 
2.2. Remedies against liability 
A director is only liable if an irrevocable judicial judgment is pronounced or if he 
voluntarily accepts his liability. It is not an established fact that the damages and fines 
paid and the cost of defending made by a director must come at his own expense, since 
these costs stem from his actions or failure to act as a director of the corporation 
(Potjewijd 2003). The legal literature makes a distinction between the internal and 
external liability of directors. The remedies against liability claims can also be divided in 
an internal and external cluster. 
 
2.2.1. Exclusion or limitation of internal liability 
Directors may stipulate that their contracts include a clause providing for an exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability. This means directors are excluded for claims of the 
                                             
21 Section 2:149/259 declares Section 2:138/248 of similar application with regard to the supervisory director. 
22 HR June 7, 1996, NJ 1996, 695 (Van Zoolinge) and HR June 8, 2001, NJ 2001, 454 (Panmo). 
23 Section 2:138/248 subsection 3. 
24 Section 2:139/249. 
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corporation by virtue of Section 2:9. An exclusion of liability clause provides for exclusion 
of liability in advance. In The Netherlands it is possible for a corporation to exclude or 
limit the internal liability of directors beforehand on the basis of Section 2:9 as long as it 
does not extend to an act or failure to act that can be characterized as intentional or 
intentionally reckless (Orsel 2006). Besides this, managing and supervisory directors can 
also be granted a discharge by the corporation. A discharge is a release of liability after 
the fact. If a discharge is granted to a director, the corporation can no longer hold him 
accountable for improper management. If, on the basis of the report, the Enterprise 
Chamber finds mismanagement, it may nullify the resolution granting a discharge. 
 
2.2.2. Indemnification for external liability 
Directors can also stipulate that their contracts include a clause providing for an 
indemnification for external liability. An indemnification may be granted to directors 
under Dutch law since an implicit or explicit legal provision prohibiting such a clause is 
absent (Glasz et al. 1994; De Nijs Bik 1998). In The Netherlands an exclusion of liability 
and indemnification clause can be incorporated in the articles of association. It is also 
possible to lay down such a clause in a separate contract. The aim of an indemnification 
clause is to compensate a director for the loss he suffered due to the disputes he is 
personally involved in because of the position he fulfils within the corporation (Potjewijd 
2003). Firstly, the members of the board of directors can be reimbursed for the amount of 
damages they are personally due for. Secondly, the members of the board of directors 
have a right to be reimbursed for reasonable25 costs of defending claims. Lastly, a member 
of the board of directors has a right to be reimbursed for costs of legal assistance in case 
no claim against him is submitted but he gets involved in a lawsuit on account of the 
position he fulfils within the corporation. 
 
2.2.3. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance 
In granting an indemnification the loss suffered will come at the expense of the 
corporation. The situation is completely different if the corporation has concluded a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to cover this risk. The loss will now come at the 
expense of the insurer. Central to a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is to cover 
the personal liability of directors. Besides this, such insurance can also be concluded by a 
corporation to cover the risk it runs after it has granted an exclusion or limitation of 
internal liability and indemnification for external liability to the directors. This will almost 
always be included in a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (Franssen van de Putte 
2004). It is in the best interest of a corporation to enter into a directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance. Firstly, external liability of a director can also lead to liability of the 
corporation.26 If the insurance enables a director to fulfil his debt, the corporation is also 
freed (De Nijs Bik, 1998). Secondly, it is also better to insure the risk of internal liability. 
Usually it concerns a substantial amount of money. If the director is unable to pay the 
amount of money claimed by the corporation, the capital position of the corporation is 
being affected (De Nijs Bik, 1998). Lastly, side effects can occur if directors are too afraid 
                                             
25 Section 6:69 (2) and HR October 16, 1998, NJ 1999, 196. 
26 Section 6:170, 171 and 172. 
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of being held liable (Kroeze, 2005). Fear can lead to directors becoming extremely 
cautious. The economy of a country can experience serious disadvantages of risk avers 
behavior by entrepreneurs. 
 
2.2.4. Disclosure 
According to Section 2:382(2) and Section 2:383e a corporation must state in the notes to 
the annual report the amount for which it has granted loans and guarantees to their 
managing and supervisory directors. Van Schilfgaarde (2006) is of the opinion that this also 
includes a clause providing for an exclusion of liability and indemnification. The legislator 
has not ventured an opinion on that point. According to Potjewijd (2003), the existence of 
an exclusion of liability and indemnification clause means that the director finds himself in 
a financially dependent situation in proportion to the corporation. In addition, such a 
clause can lead to a situation in which the corporation lends to a director the reasonable 
costs of defending claims. If the act or failure to act of a director is qualified as serious 
negligence in an irrevocable judicial judgment the director will have to pay back all the 
money lend to him by the corporation. These financial ties of the director with the 
corporation should be made public in the annual report, but it is highly disputable whether 
Section 2:382(2) and Section 2:383e obligate a corporation to state in their annual report 
that an exclusion of liability and indemnification is granted to their directors. 
 
The risk a corporation runs by granting an exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability can be covered by a directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance. The payment of the premium to the insurer can be seen as a cost for the 
corporation and must be included in the financial statements. The rules and regulations do 
not prescribe that a corporation presents these costs separately and as a result they 
cannot be distinguished from the other costs disclosed in the financial report. In addition, 
nowhere is stated that a corporation is obligated to disclose information on which 
insurances have been concluded.  
 
Furthermore, no relevant case law could be found. This leads to the conclusion that a 
listed corporation in The Netherlands is not required to disclose any information regarding 
a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external 
liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. 
 
2.3. Motives for voluntary disclosure 
Proposed introductions of, or amendments to, mandated accounting requirements are 
always a source of great interest to corporate management. They often spend a lot of time 
and effort trying to influence accounting regulators. On the other hand corporations also 
release financial and non-financial information in excess of that what is required by 
regulations. What could motivate such behavior? 
 
2.3.1. Positive Accounting Theory 
There are several theories aimed at predicting and explaining particular accounting-
related phenomena. Positive Accounting Theory developed by Watts and Zimmerman and 
others is one of them. It is based on research that proposed that markets were efficient 
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and that contractual arrangements were used as a basis for controlling the efforts of self-
interested agents. It focuses on how accounting can assist in the functioning of the agency 
relationship and emphasizes that accounting can be used to reduce the agency costs of a 
corporation. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) identified three hypotheses that were frequently used in 
research that sought to explain and predict accounting practice. The hypotheses identified 
are the bonus plan hypothesis, the debt/equity hypothesis and the political cost 
hypothesis. The political cost hypothesis can be used to explain voluntary disclosures. 
Some corporations have a higher public profile than others and are therefore subject to 
greater interest by the public, media, government, financial analysts and so on. According 
to Linsley and Shrives (2003), these corporations can enclose more additional information 
to avert this unwanted attention. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) believe that the magnitude 
of the political costs is highly dependent on corporation size. Healy and Palepu (2001) are 
more cautious and point out that size is likely to proxy for many other factors. Financial 
analysts have a significant influence on a corporation. Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that 
firms with more informative disclosures have larger analyst following, less dispersion in 
analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) 
find a positive correlation between the level of voluntary disclosure and the number of 
analysts following, the number of news items and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. 
 
2.3.2. Voluntary disclosure literature 
 Research on voluntary disclosure focuses on capital market motives for accounting and 
disclosure decisions. This research supplements the positive accounting literature. 
Researchers discuss six forces that effect managers’ disclosure decisions for capital market 
reasons: capital market transactions, corporate control contest, stockcompensation, 
litigation, proprietary costs and management talent signaling. 
 
Only two of these forces are useful for this research: capital market transactions and 
litigation. In the capital market transactions hypothesis great importance is attached to 
investors’ perception of a corporation. Healy and Palepu (2001) conclude that there is a 
significant relation between investors’ perceptions and the managers’ decision to issue 
public debt or equity. Through greater disclosure, corporations attempt to reduce the cost 
of capital by reducing investor uncertainty. Research supports the idea that there is a 
negative relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital 
(Barry and Brown 1985, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Botosan 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee 2002; Francis et al. 2005). 
 
The cost of litigation also effects managers’ disclosure decisions. Corporate managers face 
the threat of a claim of shareholders or other investors after voluntarily disclosing 
information. Legal action could be brought against managers for inadequate or untimely 
disclosures. This could encourage corporations to increase voluntary disclosure. Litigation 
could also reduce managers’ incentives to provide disclosure. The legal system therefore 
plays an important role in the managers’ decision to voluntarily disclose information (Healy 
and Palepu 2001). Large, wealthy corporations face a greater litigation risk since litigants 
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seek out corporations that can potentially pay a high amount of damages (Kothari et al. 
2009). 
 
The Signalling Theory can also help to explain why corporations choose to voluntarily 
disclose information. It suggests that some corporations wish to signal the capital market 
about having stronger risk management capabilities than others (Linsley and Shrives 2003). 
High quality corporations, in order to distinct themselves from low quality corporations, 
will have to voluntarily provide investors with credible information (Çelik et al. 2006). 
 
 
3. Hypotheses development and research design 
 
3.1.  Hypotheses development 
Directors are nowadays being held liable by the corporation as well as third parties more 
often when problems occur within the corporation (Vroom 1999; Potjewijd 2003; Van 
Olffen 2004; Assink and Olden 2005). There are a number of remedies against such claims. 
Directors may stipulate that their contacts include a clause providing for an exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability. Such a clause can 
be qualified as a risk for the corporation. To cover this risk a corporation can conclude a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The fact that directors nowadays run a greater 
risk of being held liable and the amount of money claimed by third parties has rapidly 
increased over the last decade, make it important for shareholders and potential investors 
to know whether the corporation has granted the managing and supervisory directors an 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability. To 
know whether the corporation has concluded a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance 
to cover this risk, is possibly even more important for them. 
 
Public indignation regarding a number of corporate scandals have lead to an increasing 
demand of transparency and information disclosure and an emphasis on the importance of 
decision usefulness of annual reports. The most important criticism is the fact that the 
information being provided in annual reports is too much based on the past and 
insufficiently focused on the future (Knoops 2004). More information should be disclosed 
dealing with opportunities and threats, risks and all sorts of events and circumstances that 
can be of influence on future developments of the corporation. Disclosing more 
information about possible risks and whether or not the corporation has taken any 
precautions to cover those elements of risk could contribute to this. In other words, 
disclosing information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance could enhance the decision usefulness of annual reports. A listed corporation in 
The Netherlands is not required to disclose any information regarding a granted exclusion 
or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a concluded 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Therefore, it is especially interesting to see 
whether corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX significantly differ in disclosing 
information concerning this subject. The most important way for corporations to disclose 
information is still through regulated financial reports (Healy and Palepu 2001). This leads 
to the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1 (a) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their annual report than corporations 
   listed on the AMX. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (b) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their annual report than corporations 
   listed on the AScX. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (c) Corporations listed on the AMX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their annual report than corporations 
   listed on the AScX. 
 
In The Netherlands, an exclusion of liability and indemnification clause can also be 
incorporated in the articles of association. Therefore the following hypotheses are 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (a) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their articles of association than  
   corporations listed on the AMX. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (b) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their articles of association than  
   corporations listed on the AScX. 
Hypothesis 2 (c) Corporations listed on the AMX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their articles of association than  
   corporations listed on the AScX. 
3.2. Research design 
The website of Euronext gives an overview of all national indices and which corporations 
are listed on these different indices. The corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX in 
2006 are shown in Appendix A. 
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There is no database in existence that contains the detailed information that is needed to 
conduct this research. Company.info was used to download all the annual reports. The 
articles of association are not included in this database. These were downloaded from the 
website of the corporation. In The Netherlands, an exclusion of liability and 
indemnification clause can also be laid down in an employment contract. This possibility 
will not be examined because a corporation does not provide any information regarding the 
employment contract of their directors. 
 
An independent t-test will be conducted to assess whether corporations listed on the AEX, 
AMX or AScX significantly differ in voluntarily disclosing information regarding a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in their annual report or articles of 
association. The independent t-test is applicable since it determines whether two 
distributions significantly differ from each other and different subjects are assigned to 
conduct the test (Field 2000). The statistical research will be carried out on SPSS. 
 
3.3.  Presuppositions 
Three presuppositions are made with regard to the empirical research. Firstly, all 
corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX have granted their directors an exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and concluded a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. No conclusions can be drawn without this 
presupposition. Not disclosing information regarding a directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance in the annual report or articles of association, for example, could otherwise 
mean that the corporation simply did not conclude a directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance. Nassau verzekeringen N.V. and AIG Europe N.V., two major players on the 
Dutch market for directors’ and officers’ liability insurances, state that the top five 
hundred corporations in The Netherlands, including all the listed corporations, have 
concluded a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (Van den Heuvel, 2007). 
 
Secondly, it is presupposed that if in the annual report or articles of association is stated 
that an exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability 
may be granted or a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance may be concluded by the 
corporation, this can be seen as sufficient evidence that an exclusion or limitation of 
internal liability and indemnification for external liability is granted or a directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance is concluded by the corporation. 
 
Lastly, it is a possibility that the annual report does not mention both the granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Sometimes only one of the two is 
mentioned. In that case, however, it is presupposed that both are mentioned. Without this 
presupposition it is very difficult to draw a meaningful comparison and come to an overall 
conclusion. The same, off course, applies to the articles of association. 
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3.4.  Limitations 
The empirical research of this thesis is subject to two limitations. Firstly, the annual 
report and articles of association are not the only sources of information disclosed by 
corporations. However, the most important way for corporations to disclose information is, 
in my opinion, through their annual reports. According to Lang and Lundholm (1993), a 
positive correlation exists between information being dispersed by annual reports and 
other types of information. This suggests that corporations coordinate their overall 
disclosure policy. In addition, Hail (2002) believes that, given their formalized structure, 
annual reports are more easily comparable among corporations than less formal 
communication channels. 
 
The second limitation is that a corporation, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, can also be 
listed on an index in another country. This especially applies, in my opinion, to 
corporations listed on the AEX. As a consequence, different rules and regulations could 
apply to these corporations. This limitation will be met by investigating which corporations 
are also listed on the NYSE and how many of them disclose the relevant information. 
According to their website, the NYSE is the largest equities marketplace in the world. The 
listed corporations represent approximately $25 trillion of total global market value per 
December 31, 2006. All corporations listed on the NYSE are compelled to apply the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in 2002, but some 
corporations just had to apply to these new rules per January 2006. It was introduced to 
improve quality, transparency and reliability of financial reports of public corporations 
(Jain and Rezaee, 2005). 
 
 
4.  Results 
The annual reports and articles of association of the seventy corporations listed on the 
three indices are scrupulously examined. The results of this examination are shown in 
Appendix B, C and D. An independent t-test is conducted to determine whether the 
ascertained differences between the three indices are indeed significant. The null 
hypothesis is tested that there is no difference in voluntarily disclosing between the three 
indices. The confidence interval is set at 95%. Choosing a higher confidence interval means 
you can be stricter about your analysis but you run a higher risk of failing to detect a 
genuine effect (Blalock Jr. 1979; Field 2000). 
 
The two-tailed probability is used if no prediction can be made about the direction of the 
effect. In this case a prediction can be made about which group will have the highest 
mean. Dutch law does not compel a listed corporation to disclose any information 
regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for 
external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The different 
theories and hypotheses discussed, lead me to believe that a larger corporation will choose 
to voluntarily disclose more information. In other words, it is probable the level of 
disclosure will show a declining trend since the corporations listed on the AEX, AMX and 
AScX represent approximately €536 billion, €40 billion and €20 billion per December 31, 
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2006.27 Since SPSS only produces the two-tailed significance, the obtained p-value needs to 
be divided by two to ascertain the one-tailed probability. The results of the t-tests are 
shown in Appendix E and F. Comparing the results for the level of disclosure concerning a 
granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability 
and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in the annual reports makes 
clear that there is only a significant difference between the means of the AEX and AScX. 
The one-tailed value of p is 0.018. There is no significant difference between the means of 
the AEX and AMX. In this case the one-tailed probability is 0.285. The means of the AMX 
and AScX also do not significantly differ from each other. The one-tailed p-value is 0.068. 
Comparing the results for the articles of association provides a similar picture. There is 
only a significant difference between the means of the AEX and AScX. The one-tailed p-
value is 0.024. There is no significant difference between the means of the AEX and AMX. 
The means of the AMX and AScX also do not significantly differ from each other. These t-
tests are non-significant because p = 0.112 respectively 0.235. 
 
A limitation of this research is that a corporation, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, can also 
be listed on an index in another country. As a consequence, different rules and regulations 
could apply to these corporations. This limitation is met by investigating which 
corporations are also listed on the NYSE and how many of them disclose the relevant 
information. The NYSE is the largest equity market in the world and the rules and 
regulations that apply to the corporations listed on the NYSE are perceived as one of the 
most comprehensive in existence today. Nine corporations were listed on the AEX as well 
as on the NYSE in 2006: ABN AMRO Holding N.V., Aegon N.V., Buhrmann N.V., ING Groep 
N.V., Reed Elsevier N.V., Royal Dutch Shell plc, Royal KPN N.V., Royal Philips Electronics, 
and Unilever N.V. None of the corporations listed on the AMX or AScX are also listed on the 
NYSE. According to Appendix B, only six of the nine corporations disclose the information 
concerned. This means that the rules and regulations that apply to the corporations listed 
on the NYSE do not prescribe the disclosure of this type of information. 
 
 
5.  Analysis and suggestions for future research 
 
5.1. Analysis 
After an analysis of the different outputs produced by SPSS it can be concluded that 
corporations listed on the AEX more often disclose information concerning a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance than corporations listed on the AScX. 
They voluntarily disclose this type of information more often in their annual report as well 
as in their articles of association. Additional research proves that this outcome is not 
influenced by the fact that some corporations listed on the AEX are also listed on the 
NYSE. 
 
                                             
27 www.euronext.com (last visited February 20, 2007). 
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In the second chapter a theoretical framework was presented to explain such differences 
in the level of disclosure. The political cost hypothesis predicts that some corporations 
have a higher public profile than others and are therefore subject to greater interest by 
the public, media, government, financial analysts and so on. According to Linsley and 
Shrives (2003), these corporations can enclose more additional information to avert 
unwanted attention. It can be argued that corporations listed on the AEX have a higher 
public profile than corporations listed on the AScX. 
 
In the capital market transactions hypothesis great importance is attached to investors’ 
perception of a corporation. Prior research predicts that corporations reliant on external 
financing are more likely to undertake a higher level of disclosure (Francis et al. 2005). 
Through greater disclosure, corporations attempt to lower their cost of both debt and 
equity capital by reducing investors uncertainty. This argument may also relate to 
corporation size (Çelik et al. 2006). Larger corporations make greater use of debt because 
of tax advantage. It can therefore be argued that corporations listed on the AEX undertake 
a higher level of disclosure. 
 
The decision to disclose information is also effected by the cost of litigation. This threat of 
litigation can have two effects. Legal action could be brought against managers for 
inadequate or untimely disclosures. This could encourage them to increase voluntary 
disclosure. Litigation could also reduce managers’ incentives to provide disclosure. The 
legal system therefore plays an important role in the decision to voluntarily disclose 
information. Large, wealthy corporations face a greater litigation risk since litigants seek 
out corporations that can potentially pay a high amount of damages (Kothari et al. 2009). 
The litigation hypothesis asserts that the incentive to disclose information is lower for 
corporations listed on the AEX. On one occasion the spokesperson of a corporation listed on 
the AEX told me they explicitly choose not to disclose any information on whether or not a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance has been concluded by the corporation, because 
they felt this could only attract liability claims. 
 
The Signalling Theory suggests that some corporations wish to signal the capital market 
about having stronger risk management capabilities than others (Linsley and Shrives 2003). 
High quality corporations, in order to distinct themselves from low quality corporations, 
will have to voluntarily provide investors with credible information (Çelik et al. 2006). In 
this respect it is interesting to mention that an employee of a corporation listed on the 
AEX told me they released information in excess of that what is required by regulation for 
this exact reason. The corporation wants to emphasize that it is more transparent than 
other corporations. It also wants to enhance the usefulness of its annual report. 
 
The different theories and hypotheses give reason to believe that a large corporation will 
choose to voluntarily disclose more information. The level of disclosure would then show a 
declining tendency since the corporations listed on the AEX, AMX and AScX represent 
approximately €536 billion, €40 billion and €20 billion. The different outputs produced by 
SPSS only partially support this line of reasoning. Comparing the results for the level of 
disclosure concerning a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
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indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance in the annual reports makes clear that there is no declining trend. The results 
for the articles of association do show a declining tendency. It is interesting to note that 
the corporations listed on the AMX do not significantly differ in their level of disclosure 
from the corporations listed on the AEX despite the fact that they represent almost the 
same market value as the corporations listed on the AScX. A conclusive explanation cannot 
be found in the theories and hypotheses discussed. Apparently there are still more factors 
that influence the level of disclosure. 
 
5.2.  Suggestions for future research 
The first two suggestions for future research are related to the two limitations of the 
empirical research. Firstly, the annual report and articles of association are not the only 
sources of information disclosed by corporations. One suggestion is to examine more 
sources of information.  
 
Secondly, a corporation, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, can also be listed on an index in 
another country. Another suggestion is to investigate other influential indices in the world 
to determine their influence on this research. 
 
Disclosing more information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability 
and indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance could enhance the decision usefulness of annual reports. The third suggestion is 
to determine the value users of annual reports attach to the disclosure of this information. 
 
Research results concerning the level of disclosure and the existence of differences 
between the three indices provide accounting policymakers with useful knowledge for 
designing disclosure rules. The last suggestion is to research the need to alter the rules and 
regulation in connection with the results of this master thesis. 
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
First an overview is given of the legal grounds on which a director can be held liable 
according to Dutch law. A distinction can be made between internal and external liability. 
Internal liability can be seen as liability towards the corporation. External liability is 
liability towards third parties. A director is only liable if an irrevocable judicial judgment is 
pronounced or if he voluntarily accepts his liability. Directors may stipulate that their 
contracts include a clause providing for an exclusion or limitation of internal liability. This 
means directors are excluded in advance for claims of the corporation. Directors can also 
stipulate that their contacts include a clause providing for an indemnification for external 
liability. The aim of an indemnification clause is to compensate a director for the loss he 
suffered due to the disputes he is personally involved in because of the position he fulfills 
within the corporation. Central to a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is to cover 
the personal liability of managing and supervisory directors. Besides this, such insurance 
can also be concluded by a corporation to cover the risk it runs after it has granted an 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability to the 
directors. A listed corporation in The Netherlands is not required to disclose any 
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information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance. 
 
If corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX significantly differ from each other in 
disclosing information regarding a granted exclusion of liability and indemnification clause 
and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, a possible explanation might be 
found in accounting theory. According to the political cost hypothesis, some corporations 
have a higher public profile and are therefore subject to greater interest by the public, 
media, government, financial analysts and so on. To avert this unwanted attention they 
can enclose more additional information. In the capital market transactions hypothesis 
great importance is attached to investors’ perception of a corporation. Through greater 
disclosure, corporations attempt to lower their cost of both debt and equity capital by 
reducing investors uncertainty. The decision to disclose information is also effected by the 
cost of litigation. According to the Signalling Theory, some corporations wish to signal the 
capital market about having stronger risk management capabilities than others. 
 
Comparing the results for the level of disclosure concerning a granted exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a concluded 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in the annual reports makes clear that there is 
only a significant difference between the means of the AEX and AScX. Comparing the 
results for the articles of association provides a similar picture. 
 
The different theories and hypotheses give reason to believe that a large corporation will 
choose to voluntarily disclose more information. The level of disclosure would then show a 
declining tendency since the corporations listed on the AEX, AMX and AScX represent 
approximately €536 billion, €40 billion and €20 billion. The different outputs produced by 
SPSS only partially support this line of reasoning. Comparing the results for the level of 
disclosure concerning a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance in the annual reports makes clear that there is no declining trend. The results 
for the articles of association do show a declining tendency. It is interesting to note that 
the corporations listed on the AMX do not significantly differ in their level of disclosure 
from the corporations listed on the AEX despite the fact that they represent almost the 
same market value as the corporations listed on the AScX. A conclusive explanation cannot 
be found in the theories and hypotheses discussed. Apparently there are still more factors 
that influence the level of disclosure. 
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Appendix A: Listed corporations in The Netherlands in 2006 
 
 
AEX AMX AScX 
ABN AMRO Holding N.V. Aalberts Industries N.V. Arcadis N.V. 
Aegon N.V. ASM International N.V. Ballast Nedam N.V. 
Koninklijke Ahold N.V. Koninklijke BAM Groep N.V. Beter Bed Holding N.V. 
Akzo Nobel N.V. BinckBank N.V. Brunel International N.V. 
ArcelorMittal N.V. Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster N.V. Draka Holding N.V. 
ASML Holding N.V. Corio N.V. Eurocommercial Properties N.V. 
Buhrmann N.V. Crucell N.V. Exact Holding N.V. 
Koninklijke DSM N.V. CSM N.V. Grontmij N.V. 
Fortis N.V. Fugro N.V. Hunter Douglas N.V. 
Hagemeyer N.V. Heijmans N.V. Imtech N.V. 
Heineken N.V. LogicaCMG N.V. Laurus N.V. 
ING Groep N.V. Nutreco Holding N.V. Macintosh Retail Group N.V. 
Koninklijke KPN N.V. Océ N.V. OPG Groep N.V. 
Koninklijke Numico N.V. Ordina N.V. Pharming Group N.V. 
Koninklijke Philips N.V SNS Reaal N.V. Sligro Food Group N.V. 
Randstad Holding N.V. Stork N.V. Smit Internationale N.V. 
Reed Elsevier N.V. Tele Atlas N.V. Telegraaf Media Groep N.V. 
Rodamco Europe N.V. USG People N.V. Koninklijke Ten Cate N.V. 
Royal Dutch Shell plc Van der Moolen Holding N.V. Unit 4 Agresso N.V. 
SBM Offshore N.V. Koninklijke Vopak N.V. Van Lanschot N.V. 
TNT N.V. Wereldhave N.V. VastNed Offices/Industrial N.V. 
TomTom N.V. Koninklijke Wessanen N.V. Vastned Retail N.V. 
Unilever N.V.  Wavin N.V. 
Vedior N.V.   
Wolters Kluwer N.V.   
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